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ABSTRACT 
 
Natural resource management issues are one of the world’s top concerns today and the 
involvement of local level institutions is of great importance for efficiently conserving natural 
resources. Recent drastic socioeconomic transformations underway in the Amazon region have 
affected local populations and have altered patterns of resource exploitation, notably in the 
commercial fishery sector. Unlike fisheries elsewhere, the intensification of commercial fishing 
in the Amazon has not yet led to the breakdown of subsistence fisheries.  Since the 1970’s, 
several Amazonian peasant communities have demanded political and legal support for their 
management practices and property rights. Sixty-two riverine communities of the Brazilian 
Amazon basin and their accomplishments in managing collective owned fisheries were studied 
from September/1997 to June/1999.  Data on community organization and household economic 
strategy were collected in loco by means of discussion groups, structured interviews, mapping 
and participant observation.  Each community’s Common Property Regime (CPR) were 
classified and analyzed according to a combination of ecological and institutional economics 
theories.  As predicted, territorial defense should increase with higher external competition for 
local resources and restrictions to individual level of appropriation should increase if resources 
become scarcer relative to internal consumption pressure.  Complemented by the household’s 
microeconomic perspective, these two sets of “environmental” factors seem to explain the 
arrangement of operationalization rules observed in each community.  As expected, open-access 
regimes (CPR I) were found at situations where perceived resource scarcity is at its highest and 
competition pressure at its lowest level. Fully developed management schemes (CPR III) were 
found at situations where fish resources were moderately abundant and internal competition 
more intense.  Household’s economic structure and opportunities (age structure, land tenure, and 
source of income) are shown to be correlated to household’s decisions with respect to adherence 
or not to the community’s management scheme.  The potential conserving aim of each type of 
CPR are highlighted and discussed. Suggestions are made on how the local society could move 
towards a model of fisheries co-management where public policies are designed to encourage 
partnerships, local incentives for sustainable use and sharing of power and responsibility for 
resources management and conservation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
One clear result from more than two decades of research is the finding that people do not 
always follow the inexorable logic of the  “Tragedy of The Commons” metaphor (Hardin 1968; 
Berkes 1985; McKean 1992; Simmons & Schwartz-Shea 1993). Users of Common-pool 
resources such as peasant communities have repeatedly shown their capacity to organize 
themselves. Members make credible commitments to monitor each other’s behavior and impose 
sanctions on those who display inappropriate behaviors. Thus, the idea of decentralizing natural 
resource management to local communities is increasingly gaining acceptance in policy making 
and in people-centered development projects (Ostrom 1990; Cernea 1991; Carney & Farrington 
1998).  
There are, however, two kinds of problems that may make local self-regulation less likely 
to be successfully achieved than it appears at first sight. Regulation of appropriation level may 
seriously limit a household’s income, and, for this reason, is liable to generate strong opposition 
from some resource appropriators. Additionally, regulation may have organizational costs for 
participant households making the management scheme costly to achieve and maintain (Baland 
& Platteau 1996).  Despite an impressive growth of theory and empirical research during the last 
several decades, the origin and dynamics of collective action remain disputed (Heckathorn 
1996). As pointed out by Taylor (1992), it is necessary to provide a better explanation of why 
some groups of users are able to solve their own collective action dilemma endogenously - 
without external help - and other groups are not.  
The artisanal fishing communities of the Middle Amazon River provide a “natural 
laboratory” in which it is possible to explore these issues. In this region, some communities have 
autonomous local resource management schemes to regulate their fishing practices while others 
do not. Of those that do, some control only access to fishing grounds, while others control both 
access and individuals’ level of resource appropriation. In some communities, there is 
widespread adherence to the management scheme, and in others opposition threatens to destroy 
the management institution and to deplete the local fish stocks.  
The hypotheses tested here link the emergence (or lack thereof) of local management 
institutions to the intensity of resource competition experienced by the community. They also 
link the successful maintenance (or failure) of these institutions to social attributes of the 
community, and to the economic behavior and structure of households within the community. 
Most of the analytical tools used in formulating a conceptual framework for this study come 
from New Institutional Economics and the emergent theory of Common Property (Bates 1988; 
Wheelock & Oughton 1996; McCay & Jones 1997). Together these hypotheses form an 
integrative approach of ecological theories of human territoriality under the paradigm of rational-
choice theory of collective action (Ostrom 1997). This work is an attempt to establish 
epistemological connections between the human component and the environmental components 
of a Common-pool Resource situation.  
The conjunction of the ecological, the social and the microeconomics contexts in which 
each community is embedded is thought greatly to influence the emergence and performance of 
Common-pool Resource institutions. Thus, resource physical attributes, intensity of competition, 
initial community social capital and wealth stratification, and household economic behavior are 
predicted to explain why some groups of users are able to solve their own collective-action 
dilemma endogenously while other groups are not.     
This research also intends to unveil the reasons for the failure of local management 
institutions. To attain this goal, communities where the predictions of the “Tragedy of the 
Commons” are fulfilled are also examined. In those CPR situations, the custodian communities 
desired regulatory norms and access rules to govern local fisheries but failed in implementing 
and/or supporting a local management institution. 
This study presents an in-depth understanding of the dynamics of the existing innovative 
and spontaneous self-help organizations and suggests how this understanding could be used as a 
base for developing local alliances and coalitions among rural communities, municipal 
institutions and national development agencies. Such alliances would allow locally managed 
small-scale fisheries to be incorporated into natural resource management policies.  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Theories of Human Territoriality - These theories relate property regimes to the 
physical characteristics of the resource and to the economics of its defense. Local management 
institutions often require the defense of a territory within which the resident group controls or 
restricts use of resources. Ecological theories hold that no benefits accrue from territorial defense 
unless there is competition for resources, and that competition is expected to increase as 
resources become scarcer, relative to population density (Dyson-Hudson & Smith 1978; Cashdan 
1983). From this perspective, when a resource is locally abundant in relation to the local 
population needs and competition is at a minimum, a resident group is less likely to bear the 
costs of creating and maintaining a social institution for governing the exploitation of its 
resource.   
Predictability is another important environmental variable that has been associated with 
territoriality, since resources that are unpredictable, transient, or highly mobile should be less 
economical to defend. Thomas (1996) has found empirical evidence to support these theoretical 
predictions. His studies of patterns of fisheries tenure of the Hadejia-Jama’are floodplain have 
shown that rights of access to fish at a particular location change with the status of the flood. At 
the height of the flood, the area inundated is extensive and the fishery is open access. Similarly, 
in the Amazon, diversity of aquatic habitats, fluctuations of water level and fish species life 
history must play an important role in defining the temporal and spatial dynamic of the 
cost/benefit relation of territorial defense.  
Physical attributes of fish as a resource, such as high mobility, generate obstacles to 
complete privatization and conventional management. Nevertheless, Amazonian fishers, like 
many other fishers around the world, have developed a deep knowledge of fish and fishery 
ecology that allows rational allocation of their conservationist efforts. Knowing the behavior of 
the species and the ecological attributes of a local environment, fishers can predict very 
accurately where and when reproductive adults and pre-reproductive juveniles will concentrate 
during certain periods of the year. Traditional community-based management schemas are based 
primarily on defense of fishing grounds rather than on control of collective or individual 
extraction levels. For the same reasons norms of restricted access, where they exist, are 
discriminated according to type of fishing grounds and phases of fish species life history.  
Common-pool Resource Theory - In addition to these considerations, there is another 
series of attributes, that of the social group of appropriators, that may affect the expected 
relationships between environmental variables and territoriality (Cashdan 1983).  Ostrom (1992) 
points to one of the variables critical to the survival of community-based management    
institutions: ownership status of the resource. Ownership status refers to the sustainable and 
certain rights that appropriators have to access, use, and potentially, to exclude others from 
resources. This definition implies the existence of culturally accepted mechanisms that allow 
resident appropriators to claim property rights over resource stocks. A pre-condition for the 
exercise of property rights is the definition of clear-cut boundaries of the Common-pool 
resource. An important aspect to be investigated is the cultural mechanisms by which 
communities claim ownership over fishing grounds in floodplain areas where landscape features 
such land-water interfaces are changing continuously. In other words, how is a water tenure 
system articulated by those communities and how it is related to the land ownership regime and 
legal system? 
Other social components of a Common-pool resource situation refer to internal attributes 
of the custodian community. Ostrom (1992) pointed out that the existence of a general-purpose 
organizational structure, such as a village council or a cooperative organization, facilitates the 
emergence of Common-pool resource institutions. If a resident group of resource appropriators is 
to create a local management scheme, it must be able to meet the required transaction costs, i.e., 
the costs of creating, negotiating, monitoring and enforcing a collective agreement. Rural 
sociologists have long recognized that positive interaction and problem sharing characteristics of 
successful local management institutions are also core aspects of community development 
processes (Swaney 1990; Wilkinson 1991). A community’s social capital in the form of norms of 
reciprocity, mutual trust, and networks of community engagement (Coleman 1990; Putnam 
1993) is expected to lower the cost of achieving an endogenous solution for local social 
dilemmas
2, such as a fishery management conflict (Singleton & Taylor 1992; Taylor & Singleton 
1993). 
The transaction costs originate from finding and reinforcing solutions for two kinds of 
collective dilemmas: (1) Resource  appropriation dilemma - how access to a resource is 
controlled and how resource flow is shared among accountable appropriators so that the 
collective withdrawal is maintained at an acceptable level; and  (2) organization provisioning 
dilemma - how the costs of providing and maintaining the management institution are to be 
shared among potential beneficiaries. Resolutions to both types of dilemmas involve the 
coordination of collective action (Heckathorn 1996). Resolution of resource appropriation 
dilemmas requires that the devised management scheme satisfy both individuals’ needs and the 
viability of long-term collective use of the resource stock. In self-governed common-pool 
resource institutions, resolution of the organization provisioning dilemma requires that the 
potential beneficiaries themselves bear the costs of providing and maintaining the management 
institution.  
Common–property Regimes Typology - Access rules are inherent aspects of common-
property regimes
3 (henceforth CPR) and human territoriality and are expected to be constant in 
most communal fisheries. However, local institutions may also include withdrawal norms, that 
is, restrictions on individuals’ resource consumption level. The design of a management 
institution corresponds to a combination of access rules and resource withdrawal norms; the 
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possible combinations can be used to establish a typology for the study of Common-pool 
resource situations (Table 1). 
A Common-pool resource situation is defined here as the combination of a group of 
people and the resources they use collectively. Based on resource access rules and withdrawal 
norms, four types of Common-pool resource situations can exist. Resource access rules can be of 
two types: open access for all potential appropriators or restricted access for non-community 
members. Withdrawal norms impose limits on catch size and fishing technology used by 
authorized appropriators. Withdrawal norms can thus be either present or absent. Absence of 
withdrawal norms means that the community does not directly control an individual’s capture 
effort. Nevertheless, communities can control collective withdrawal effort by restricting the 
fishery to pure subsistence.   
 
Table 1 - Typology of Common-pool Resource situation with respect to institutional basic design. 
  Withdrawal norms 
Access rules  absent Present 
flexible or open access  Type I  Type IV 
Restricted to community members  Type  II  Type III 
Source: adapted from Baland & Platteau (1996). 
 
The Type IV case, flexible access rule and conservation, is problematic because in the 
absence of strict access rules it may prove difficult to ensure that conservation measures are 
followed by resource users. Type IV situations are unlikely to arise when common-pool 
resources are well localized and local communities define access rights. Type IV was not 
encountered in this research.  However, it is worth stressing that the Type IV combination points 
to a potential solution to complex problems of environmental management in the context of non-
excludable resources or resource domains (Baland & Platteau 1996). 
The combinations of rules and norms (Table 2) describe the three actually occurring types 
of Amazonian Common-Property Regimes (CPR). Communities classified in Type III CPR 
presented diverse sets of operational rules. For that reason, CPR III agreements were subdivided 
according to two sets of main rules: commercialization forbidden (1) or allowed according to 
particular rules (2) and absence of restrictions on capture techniques (0) or presence of 
restrictions (1). The combination of these two rules creates 4 subtypes of Type III CPR (Table 3). 
 
 
Table 2 - Characteristics and indicators of Common-Property Regimes (CPR). 
Type I  - Non-managed CPR  Type II -  Regulated CPR  Type III - Managed CPR 
  Withdrawal rights of non-
community members  (commercial 
or subsistence fishers) are 
unrestricted or obtained by informal 
arrangements. 
Withdrawal rights are denied to 
non-community members 
according to community rules. 
Withdrawal rights are denied 
to non-community members 
according to community rules. 
 
 
 No formal norms regulating 
 capture technique and effort are 
 applied to potential appropriators. 
 
No formal withdrawal norms are 
applied to community members 
other than those regarding 
resource flow allocation. 
 
Formal withdrawal norms are 
Applied to all potential 
appropriators. 
 
Source: adapted from Baland & Platteau (1996). 
 
    
Table 3 – Typology of communities according to type of CPR. 
CPR 
Type 
Sub-type Defense  of 
exclusive territories 
Commercialization 
allowed according to 
rules 
Restrictions on capture 
techniques 
I  a(*) no  N/A  N/A 
I  b(*) no  N/A  N/A 
II -  yes  N/A  N/A 
III  1.0 yes  no  no 
III 1.1 yes  no  yes 
III 2.0 yes  yes  no 
III 2.1 yes  yes  yes 
(*) a - communities that never tried a fishery agreement, b – communities whose former agreement failed 
or was never effectively implemented. N/A = not applicable. 
 
RESEARCH PLAN 
 
Research Site  
The natural environment - The Amazon Basin is the largest drainage area of the world, 
covering nearly one-third of South America. The gentle inclination of between 1 and 2 cm/km 
and the marked seasonality of the river discharge contribute to form a complex aquatic system in 
its valley. The main sources of primary production sustaining the aquatic biota are the areas 
periodically flooded by whitewaters, known as várzea (Forsberg et al. 1993). These areas border 
the Amazon River from Pucallpa in Peru to the ocean, with an average width of 20 to 100 km; 
they are estimated to cover a total area of 180,360 sq.-km.  
Várzea lentic habitats are essential for maintaining high levels of secondary production, 
especially fish, in the river ecosystem (Bayley 1995b). Phytoplancton is the main source of 
organic carbon for the aquatic trophic chain and its production is only of relevance in the 
whitewater rivers’ floodplain. In a large part of the river complex conditions are more lentic than 
lotic because water movements occur gradually during approximately six to nine months each 
year (Bayley 1995b). Floodplain lakes are the habitat for sedentary fish species. During flood 
peak, shallow waters on the forested levees are seasonal food habitats and refugia for migratory 
species.   
In contrast with the turbid and eutrophic waters of the Amazon main channel, blackwater 
tributary rivers are oligotrophic because of the soil chemistry composition of the catchment area.  
Blackwater streams do not form extensive floodplain deposits because their load of suspended 
sediments is very low. In this type of river, lentic habitats are formed only at main channel itself 
at its downstream most portion at their confluence with the Amazon  (Bayley  & Pretere 1989). 
These remarkable differences are also reflected in terms of fish productivity. Comparable data on 
gillnet catches/unit effort in whitewater and blackwater floodplains (Junk et al 1997) shows 
productivity five times greater in the eutrophic whitewater habitat compared to the nutrient poor 
blackwater floodplain. In the várzea an average of 210 g.m
-2 day
-1 was captured in contrast to 
41g m
-2 day
-1 in the blackwater inundated forest. 
The social environment -  Brazilian Amazon flood-plain communities were studied by 
the author in two previous research projects (Pereira & Lescure 1993, Noda et al. 1995). The 
economic strategy of Amazonian fishing communities is very similar to what Pollnac (1991) has 
described in general and cross-cultural terms as small-scale and part-time fishers’ societies. 
These communities comprise familial groups, varying on average from 10 up to 30 households,    
sparsely located along the Amazon River banks. Agroforestry systems that combine annual crops 
such as cassava (Manihot esculenta Crantz), fruit crops, extraction of non-timber forest products 
and fisheries are the major subsistence and commercial economic activities of these local 
populations. 
Recent drastic socioeconomic transformations underway in the Amazon region have 
affected local populations and have altered patterns of resource exploitation, notably in the 
commercial fishery sector (Bayley & Pretere 1989; Bayley 1995a, 1995b).  Fishing has 
traditionally been one of the most important resource procurement activities in the Amazon 
region; it represents the main source of animal protein for local populations. The transformation 
of commercial fishing in the Amazon began in the 1950’s with a series of developments that 
revolutionized fishing technology and the transportation and storage of fish products.  During the 
1960s and 1970s, commercial exploitation expanded due to federal tax incentives for fleet 
expansion and acquisition of new fishing techniques. These technological changes were 
accompanied by a great increase in urban demand for fish within the Amazon, and the 
development of national and international markets for Amazon fish products (Hartmann 1992; 
McGrath et al. 1993, 1996; Isaac 1995; Barthem 1995; Parente 1996).  
The area chosen for the present research is located in the portion of the Middle Amazon 
fishing zone that belongs to Amazonas State, an area which is not included in any of the above 
research or development projects.  The micro-region selected for this study centers around the 
municipality of Itacoatiara. This municipality is located downstream from Manaus, the capital of 
Amazonas State and its most important regional fish market. This region was chosen because it 
has recently attempted to implement municipal legislation promoting community guardianship of 
aquatic resources (Appendix a – Map of the study sites).  
Origin and formation of Itacoatiara’s rural communities  –  Today’s  rural  
“communities” as a concept and form of political organization are a recent innovation in the 
social life of Amazonian rural populations. The Brazilian Catholic Church and its main political 
organization
4 introduced the concept of CEBs  (Ecclesiastical Root Communities) in 1962. There 
was no formal political organization prior to the foundation of the rural CEB’s among the 
riverine natural settlements. However, some form of social annual grouping existed at localities 
where a “Festejo de Santo” (Festival of the Saint) and its brotherhood or a local soccer team 
required a permanent organization. The concepts of  “locality” and of  “territoriality” were thus 
already established and served to delineate the future CEB’s as a territorially based social 
organization (Wilkinson, 1991).   
Most CEBs were created in the early 1970’s, a period that corresponds to intense political 
activity by the Itacoatiara Catholic Church.  The second peak in the late 90’s corresponds to 
recent actions of the Secretary of the Interior of the Itacoatiara Municipal Government.  Since 
1997, all assistance from the government and state banks to rural communities and familial 
producers has been conditioned on the formation of a non-profit association of rural producers.  
Familial producers and local government adopted the “original” formula of the CEB’s to create 
new communities in many zones.  
Present day CPR regimes in Amazonian fisheries are best viewed as the most recent in a 
long history of adaptive responses that evolved to counteract natural and economic changes in 
the riverine environment (McGrath et al. 1993).  For Hartmann (1992), the Amazon continental 
fisheries underwent technological innovations from 1950 to 1970.  Smith (1985) and Hartmann 
(1992) identify four main innovations that were responsible for the “modernization” of 
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Amazonian fisheries: (1) labor specialization and division of labor; (2) introduction of synthetic 
twine; (3) increase in of ice manufacturing; and (4) use of Diesel engines to power fishing boats. 
The expansion of the commercial fishery was legally supported by federal decree No. 221 
(02/28/1967) which is the base for the Brazilian fishery legislation. Together, these technological 
innovations made it possible for multi-species stocks to be exploited up to their exhaustion, for 
the first time.  In Itacoatiara, a few fishery agreements had arisen in the early 1970’s, together 
with the newly organized CEBs. By that time, the effects of such innovations were already 
noticeable so that a SUDEPE
5 normative decree (#466, 02/08/1972) was sanctioned to proscribe 
several predatory capture techniques (Falabella 1994).  The year 1968 is recalled as being the 
beginning of predatory fishing by large fishing boats (“pesqueiros”) in the middle Amazon 
(Ribeiro 1991).  Smith (1979) studied fisheries in Itacoatiara in 1977 and briefly referred to 
conflicts and informal arrangements between lake residents and commercial fishing boats for 
access to restricted fishing spots. Some fishery agreements were made in the 1980s. By that time, 
rural artisanal fishers had started to exploit their own communal stocks with commercial 
purposes. By the mid-1960 the post-war jute boom had peaked, due in part to the introduction of 
synthetic fibers that replaced jute in many of its former markets. In the late 1980s the jute 
economy collapsed, for the Brazilian government permitted imports of south Asian jute, causing 
the price of Amazonian jute to drop precipitously. Formerly the main floodplain cash crop, the 
jute bankruptcy led riverine producers to turn their productive efforts to the fish market.  
In 1989, SUDEPE and IDBF were dissolved and their mandates were incorporated into 
the newly created IBAMA
6.  In 1996, Itacoatiara’s municipal congress sanctioned a decree to 
forbid commercial fishing in Serpa Lake. Nevertheless, it took eight years for the Amazonas’ 
superintendence of IBAMA (IBAMA/AM) to acknowledge the conservationist efforts of riverine 
communities and municipal governments with respect to protection of local fish stocks.  In 1997, 
IBAMA/AM proposed a partnership between riverine communities, Itacoatiara’s municipal 
government, and its local office for implementation of a participatory fishery management 
program.  This partnership is an ongoing process of negotiation.  Despite the newness of this 
experience, the “boom” of fishery agreements conveyed in 1997 denotes the potential for 
implementation of co-management regimes. 
 
Research design  
A contextual and multilevel analytic approach (Boyd & Iversen 1979) was adopted to 
explain the variation among community management institutions and household behaviors, as 
the response variables. At the community level, the predictor variables are organizational 
contribution and resource competition and abundance. The predictor variables at the household 
level are household economic opportunity and structure. To control disjunctive causes 
statistically, observation units, that is, CPR situations, must be similar in most aspects except 
with respect to their local resource management practices. It is possible to find such natural 
configurations if all communities to be compared are located within a homogenous geographic 
and social milieu. In such case, each CPR situation can be treated as a natural experimental unit 
to which management practices have been applied (Pelto & Pelto 1993). 
Phase One: Community inventory - During the first phase of research, lasting one year, 
an inventory of communities was conducted. I used a combination of diverse sources of 
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information and ex-situ data-collection techniques to avoid problems of selectivity and sample 
bias and to ensure that effectively all established fishing communities were included in the 
inventory.  Information was obtained with respect to geographic location, probable natural 
resource abundance
7, and prevalent type of fishery, community age and population size, and type 
of political organization. Satellite images and cartographic maps were used to obtain 
limnological and geographic information about the fishing grounds exploited by each 
community. Data on territoriality, fishing management and other community practices were 
obtained by interviewing community leaders and other key informants. From this inventory, 
communities were then classified according to the CPR typology  (Table 2). The data gathered in 
this first phase of research were submitted to an exploratory cluster analysis. The resulting 
clusters of similar communities were used as the sample frame for the next phase of research.   
Two major source for information were used in order to create a list of communities that 
could be used as a reference for the inventory: The Office of the Secretary of the Interior of 
Itacoatiara City and the Catholic Prelacy of Itacoatiara. The Prelacy counts only the original 
“Catholic” communities that are presently active. The office of the Secretary of the Interior has a 
database that started in 1993 and that also includes the non-Catholic “social” communities. The 
inventory created by this procedure included 62 communities - about 70% of all fishing 
communities within the 211 rural communities of the municipality of Itacoatiara. 
Phase Two: Households’ socioeconomic survey - In this phase, a sample of CPR 
situations was chosen from each homogenous cluster of communities (Kalton, 1983). They were 
selected according to the following hierarchical requirements: 
1)  Stratum sample proportional to stratum size.  
2)  Inclusion of at least one example from each sub-stratum. 
3) Maximization of the diversity of aquatic environments and geographic regions 
represented by the totality of the sampled communities. 
Total sample size was defined according to an estimate of the number of communities 
that could be properly surveyed in a 12-month period. A total of 12 communities were selected. 
Data were obtained in each community using household surveys by means of in-situ structured 
interviews, self-reported data, and participatory data collection techniques. Every effort was 
made to survey all households within each sampled community, if possible. In all cases, every 
family reachable at the time of the visit was interviewed. 
 
Research hypotheses,  data collection and analysis - In the generation of testable 
hypotheses, the evolution of local management institutions is divided into two stages: 
emergence  and maintenance. Three nested levels of approaches are suggested for investigating 
the dynamics of common property institutions: (A) the ecosystem level; (B) the social or 
community level; and (C) the microeconomic or household level. In this paper, I present only 
results and discussions about hypotheses of emergence of CPR institutions at the ecosystem and 
household levels.  
The Ecosystem and emergence CPR Institutions  – According to theoretical 
predictions, severe competition and prolonged resource scarcity tend to lead the corporate 
custodian community to adopt norms that both restrict access to resources and limit resource 
withdrawal. Thus, it was expected that internal and external competition levels should be higher 
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in Type III CPR situations than in Type II and Type I CPR situations. The following hypothesis 
was proposed: 
HA: Management institutions (Type III CPR) are more likely to 
emerge in situations where resource relative abundance is lower and 
competition is higher.  
Level of competition among resource appropriators was indirectly measured by means of 
surrogate variables. The frequency of invasion by outsiders (larger commercial fishing boats or 
small-scale fishers from other communities) was used as an indicator of the level of external 
competition pressure.  During each community inventory, interviewees were asked to recall 
episodes of invasion and report the dates, origin of the invaders, number and size of invading 
boats, how the community reacted to the invasion, and if the conflict had a resolution or not. 
Intensity of violation of fishing rules by local residents and number of local commercial fishers 
were used as indicators for internal competitiveness. Resident population size was also used to 
indicate level of internal competition. In order to estimate the relative abundance of local fish 
stocks, communal fishing spots were visited and plotted on a cartographic map and remote 
sensing images were used to determine environmental characteristics of the fishing grounds such 
as shape, location, hydrological regime (seasonal or perennial), and type of water.  
Households and the emergence CPR institutions - A household is a crucial unit of 
analysis for studying economic behavior because the rationale for choices individuals make 
about their subsistence strategies reflects how a household’s livelihood is maintained and 
reproduced (Wheelok & Oughton 1996). Because of this dependence, one expects to find causal 
relationships between a household’s economic strategy (response variables) and its economic 
structural opportunities (explanatory variables). However, since households that are members of 
a community share the benefits and duties of a collective social organization, it is questionable 
whether households can be considered only as atomized units of economic decision-making. 
According to CPR theories, household's decisions must also be influenced by decision-making at 
the collective level. 
For this study, a household economic strategy refers to how each family allocates its 
working time (either to wage labor and on-farm activities such as agriculture, animal husbandry, 
and extraction of forest products, or to fishing). Household economic structural opportunities 
refer to endowments of human capital and physical capital. 
Appropriation dilemma and household structural opportunities - The initial costs 
that a management scheme imposes reflect the reduction in resource extraction level generated. 
This economic penalty will not be compensated for if individuals cannot switch to some other 
commercial or subsistence activities through which they can profit. Previous studies of the 
relationships between household structure and economic production strategies have suggested 
that households will select strategies that match their labor availability and access to land and 
other means of production (Schumann 1985). Compared to other farming activities, fishing 
requires fewer prior investments (such as land preparation and weeding) and less endowment of 
fixed capital (such as arable land). Thus, it is predictable that violation of fish withdrawal norms 
can become part of an economic strategy adopted by a household. Households will make rational 
decisions to rely heavily upon fish harvesting when there is a shortage of arable land and/or labor 
that otherwise would have been used to engage in compensatory activities, such as manioc 
agriculture, horticulture, or extraction of forest products.  As a hypothesis, these theoretical 
considerations read:     
 HB: An individual household’ compliance with a community 
management scheme depends on its economic structure and 
alternative opportunities to fishing as source of cash income. 
 
  Household economic structural opportunity was assessed in terms of size and quality of 
arable land available to the household, composition of familial labor force by age and sex, and 
presence/absence of equipment for production such as tools, machinery and other forms of fixed 
physical capital. Household economic behavior was assessed in terms of the composition of 
household annual income. Data on fishery practices and income were obtained during interviews 
when individuals were asked to recall their previous fishing expeditions and report the sites, 
duration, capture (quantity and fish species captured), and fishing techniques used during these 
expeditions, as well as the value of the catch or its sale price. I used an economic survey 
questionnaire that was developed in my previous study of floodplain traditional production 
systems to gather these data (Noda et al. 1995).  Univariate analysis techniques were used to 
compare current households’ economic structure and their corresponding economic production 
strategies. The economic structures of households with higher economic dependence on 
commercial fishing were compared with those who were less dependent.   
 
 
 
RESULTS 
 
 
Environmental Factors and the Emergence of CPR Institutions - The great majority 
of the studied communities presented some type of CPR regime, but a minority, about 32%, 
managed their fish resources in a regimen characteristic of open access (Type I CPR) (Table 4).  
It is interesting to note that about half of the communities of the open-access group already had 
evaluated the possibility of implementing a collective fishery agreement (Type I/b CPR). 
Communities classified in Type III CPR presented diverse sets of operational rules. The 
most frequent subtype was subtype III/1.1, with which the communities aimed to restrict internal 
fish consumption through rules that reduce capture effort and increased fishery selectivity in 
communal waters. The decision between this or that regimen of common property was partly 
influenced by the geography and the ecology of the local resource and partly by the intensity of 
internal and external competition. The characteristics of the fishing spots (physical accessibility, 
dimensions, location with relation to the individual properties), and the abundance and 
concentration of fish stocks, largely determined the existence of territoriality, while the level of 
competition between authorized appropriators seemed to be the main factor affecting the 
presence or absence of measures to reduce resource exploitation rate.  
All of the rules and practices used in the 62 communities regulated how fishing was done. 
That is, they limited location, time or technology. Only one community (62 V), and solely during 
one year, limited the amount of various species that could be caught. Acheson & Wilson (1996) 
analyzed fishing practices of 39 tribal and peasant societies of diverse geographic and cultural 
origins and reported similar findings. A general identification and classification of all inventoried 
communities are provided in appendix B. 
 
 
    
Table 4 – Classification of the inventoried communities according to type of CPR (*). 
CPR 
Type 
Sub-type Defense  of 
exclusive 
territories 
Commercialization 
allowed according 
to rules 
Restrictions to 
capture 
techniques 
total % 
I a(**)  no  N/A  N/A  10  16.1 
I b(**)  no  N/A  N/A  10  16.1 
II -  yes  N/A  N/A  7 11.3 
III  1.0 yes  no  no  6  9.6 
III  1.1 yes  no  yes  18  29.0 
III  2.0 yes  yes  no  0  0.0 
III  2.1 yes  yes  yes  11  17.7 
(*) For a complete list of communities refer to Appendix B. 
(**) a - communities that never have had a fishery agreement, b – communities whose former agreement 
have failed or have never been effectively implemented. N/A =not applicable. 
 
Operational regulations of CPR regimes   
In this section several aspects of the operationalization of common property regimes are 
discussed.  It is suggested that operational regulations must be a response to fishing spots’ tenure 
regime, the perceived abundance of local resources, and the intensity and source of competition 
and disputes. Eight variables (questionnaire items) were analyzed comparatively in order to 
detect any possible pattern in answers (Table 5).  
 
Open-access: Type I/a CPR I/a versus Type I/b CPR - The profile of average 
responses of Type I/a communities was quite distinct from those of Type I/b, despite the fact that 
the current common property regime was open-access in both groups (Figure 1). In Type I/a 
communities, community members tended to evaluate the abundance of local fish resources less 
favorably than in those of Type I/b communities; at the same time that there were fewer 
commercial resident fishers and a lower internal and external competition on average.  Type I/a 
communities tended to own fishing spots that were shared by two or more communities (Figure 2 
- SHARE). Shared fishing spots were generally large. This type of common-pool resource 
situation represented a double difficulty for the agreement to a collective contract of 
preservation. The dimensions of the area to be kept must be negotiated and negotiation involves 
different groups of appropriators. In Type I/a CPR (Figure 1, first bar), the lower 
competitiveness (upper column) seemed compatible with the absence of a scheme of collective 
property. On the other hand, in Type I/b communities, where in the past there had been attempts 
at implementing a regimen of collective property, the degree of internal and external 
competitiveness was similar to those of the communities of Type III. In Type I/b CPR (Figure 1, 
second bar), there was a distinguishably higher incidence of invasion by artisanal urban fishers 
(invUA) and of artisanal fishers of the neighborhoods (invNgb). These fishers were responsible 
for a small-scale commercial fishery that was active during all seasons. Perhaps the pressure of 
these commercial fishers was one of the reasons for the backtracking of the CPR regime of these 
communities to a situation of open-access. Also, Type I/b communities seemed to have a broader 
set of fishing opportunities outside their community territories.  Together, Type I/a and Type I/b 
communities seemed to evaluate their local fishery abundance in a less favorable way than any 
other type of community, on average. This may also be related with their decision of not bearing 
the costs of a local management institution. 
    
Table 5 - Variables and response code for assessing resource ownership status, perceived abundance, 
competitiveness and fishing opportunities. 
Variable  Question as stated   Response codification 
TENURE  - Exclusively 
owned fishing spot  
Does the community claim collective 
property rights on any fishing spot 
(lake, igarapé etc) in its territory? 
(0) None  
(1) at least one 
OPEN   Is commercial fishery allowed (free) in 
any of the community’s lakes? 
(0) No 
(1) Yes 
CONFLICT  Participant observation, focus group 
interviews. Unsolved conflicts may 
exist that prevent the community from 
reaching a mutual agreement. Or, 
conflict may have raised between 
discontent appropriators and the 
collectivity.   
(0) None  
(1) Unsolved conflicts 
ABUNDANCE  Open–ended question: How good (bad) 
has fishing at community’s fishing spots 
been? 
Scale  
(3) Abundant 
(2) Normal (regular) scarcity between 
harvest seasons (flood peak) 
(1) Moderate scarcity during harvest 
season 
(0) Frequent zero capture fishing events 
SHARE - Commonly 
shared fishing spot 
Does the community share any of its 
fishing spot with any other community 
(ies)?  
(0) None  
(1) At least one 
FISH OTHER – 
Exploitation of other 
community’s fishing spot 
Do fishers from your community fish at 
any other community’s lake? 
(0)  None or a few, only  occasionally 
(1)  Yes,  several,  many, very often 
Fisher’s categorization: 
SUBS 
COMMERC 
PROF 
Does any community’s fisher sell his 
fish crop? 
Fishers were classified into three 
category: Subsistence, Commercial, 
Professional (unionized) 
(0)   none 
(1)   some 
(2)   all  
Type and intensity of 
invasion: 
(A)CM 
(B)Ngb 
(C)UA 
(D)FB 
Invaders were classified into four 
categories: 
(A) Community members 
(B)  Neighbor (rural artisanal) 
(C)  Urban based artisanal 
(D) Commercial Fishing boats  
(0) Not  cited 
(1)  Few, not so often 
(2)  Many, consistently 
 
Exclusive Fishery Territories: Type II CPR - Communities where the regimen of 
collective property only prescribed the exclusiveness of the access to communal areas registered 
a lower degree of competitiveness and greater degree of perceived abundance than any other 
group of communities (Figure 1 - ABNDC). These communities tended to depend on 
surrounding fishing spots that were exclusively used by the community (Figure 2). Besides the 
low index of fishery conflicts (Figure 1 - CNFLT), fishers of these communities generally did 
not fish in territory of other communities (Figure 2 - FISHOTHER), while at the same time they 
did not share their fishing spots with fishers of neighboring communities (Figure 2 -SHARE).  
In circumstances of larger perceived abundance of local resources and lower internal 
competitiveness, it was more viable to remain a regimen Type II than to change to Type III. 
Professional fishers (Figure 1 - invFB) were cited as the main invaders by these Type II 
communities. These fishers used equipment of larger capacity (lampara seines) capable of    
completely depleting a lake’s fish stock during a single season. Perhaps, therefore, these 
communities did not regulate the capture effort of the group of authorized appropriators (rural 
artisanal fishers), but only denied access to those not authorized, especially urban professional 
fishers from Manaus and neighboring states, mainly from Pará and Amapá states.  
“Lake Preservation”: Type III/1 versus Type III/2 CPR  - The risk of scarcity of a 
collective use resource, despite being a sine qua non condition, does not by itself justify the 
implementation of a management scheme (Type III CPR). It is necessary that the level of internal 
competition among authorized appropriators be raised to a point that justified the effort not only 
to restrict access but also to regulate the intensity of resource exploitation. Internal withdrawal 
restrictions may increase the level of invasion by authorized appropriators (Figure 1 - invCM) 
and may explain why Type III communities had the highest incidence of resource cheaters.  
The distinction between III/1 and III/2 Types of CPR is the total prohibition of 
commercialization in the first. Artisanal fishers from the neighborhoods and urban areas were 
more intensely cited as invaders in Type III/1 than in Type III/2 communities. In the majority of 
cases, invaders were associated with local residents with whom they had privately negotiated 
access to the community’s resources. This kind of invasion was severely fought against and 
frequently generated conflicts and disagreements in the communities. Communities of Type III/1 
were more dependent on exclusive fishing spots than those communities of Type III/2 (Figure 2 - 
SHARE, FISHOTHER). They did not share communal waters with other communities and fish 
less frequently in waters of their neighbors. Communities that adopted a Type III/1 regime 
considered their local fish stocks to be less abundant than those that adopted a Type III/2 regime 
(Figure  1  -  ABNDC),  following  the  trend  of  lower  relative  density  of  local  resources.  
Communities that adopted a fishery agreement of Type III/2 were more likely to have other 
communal fishing spots that were managed in an open-access regime (Figure 2 - OPEN).  This 
higher perceived abundance might explain why commercialization of fish captured in territorial 
waters was allowed according to rules in Type III/2 situations. In these communities, the level of 
unsolved conflicts was critical (Figure 1 - CNFLT) despite the fact that this kind of flexibility 
could reduce the level of tension (dissatisfaction) with rigid norms of appropriation.  
The high incidence of invasion by professional fishers and resident fishers in these 
communities indicated that commercialization rules were not easily obeyed or enforced. It is 
probable that the majority of the CPR agreements of Type III (65%) were of the subtype I/1 
because in these agreements the operational rules were simplified through a total prohibition of 
commercialization and large-scale fishing tools. Controlling how people fish minimizes 
information and enforcement costs, which makes it possible to generate more effective 
management institutions (Acheson & Wilson 1996). Controlling how much and which fish 
species people exploit and export, by way of contrast, tends to increase both kinds of costs, with 
detrimental effects on institutional efficacy. 
Annual versus Seasonal CPR - A second group comparison of importance differentiated 
between annual and seasonal CPRs (Figure 3). For this comparison, only CPR Types II and III 
were considered.   Invasion by professional fishers (invFB) and fishery conflicts were the main 
features that differentiated the average response of the annual group from that of the seasonal 
CPR group of communities. Invasion by urban professional fishers was more frequent among 
annual CPR situations.  In these communities, fish agreements were valid not only during low-
water season but also during the flood when teams of large-scale fishers transferred their activity 
locus from the river channel to the floodplain lakes.  From December until March, after the end 
of the channel catfish harvest season, it was expected that commercial fishing boats from    
Manaus and Pará State would invade Itacoatiara’s flood deposit lakes to capture mapará   
(Hypophthalmus sp.) and pescada (Plagioscium sp.) (Isaac 1996).  
In seasonal CPR situations, artisanal fishers were the main invaders (invART = 
Community member + Neighbor + Urban). Communities with seasonal CPR regimes defended 
smaller and more exclusive fishing spots (bar-and-meander lakes) that were targeted by small-
scale fishers from Itacoatiara City and its rural area.  Rural artisanal fishers from the 
communities’ neighborhood were more often cited as the main invaders in these situations.  This 
type of invasion was more likely to generate unsolved internal conflicts since invaders and 
claimants were of similar social and residential status. Community members and neighbors were 
blamed for harvesting fish from the community’s reservoirs to sell their clandestine crop in 
Itacoatiara or to the “recreio”
8 boats that take fish to Manaus.  These fishers targeted two main 
fish species: pirarucu (Arapaima gigas) and tambaqui (Colossoma macropomum). Tambaqui and 
pirarucu species are listed as endangered and thus are protected by federal laws. The pirarucu 
fishery is now closed until the year 2000 and tambaqui has a minimum size for capture.  From 
10/01/92 till 03/31/93, 15.7 tons of pirarucu were landed at Manaus. This period corresponds to 
the species’ reproductive season and the amount captured comprised 51% of all commercial 
species (Fallabela 1994). 
  Artisanal lake fisheries were much more productive during low-water season, i.e., when 
fish stocks were locked in the shrinking floodplain pools. Thus, during low-water season, the 
community had to enforce  withdrawal norms because the lakes become more tempting to 
opportunistic fishers. When channel water invades the flood plain during the inundation,  all 
lakes become interconnected and the levees become submerged. At that point, fishery 
productivity decreases and the lakes’ boundaries are no longer distinguishable.  Another key 
point is the alteration of physical access  to floodplain lakes. During the flood, invaders can 
approach communal lakes “backwards”  and not be noticed. All together, it sounds quite logical 
to loosen the fishery agreement during flood season to reduce its enforcement costs. Thomas 
(1996) described similar behavioral patterns for an African floodplain communal fishery and 
Brabo (1981) for continental fisheries in the estuarine zone of the Amazon River.   
Abundance is  a minor difference between annual and seasonal CPRs. Community 
members from annual CPR situations consider their local fish stocks to be more abundant than 
those that adopt seasonal fishery agreements. This difference might also be related to a higher 
incidence of invasion by professional fishers reported by annual CPR communities.  
                                                           
8 Recreios are large regional boats that transport passengers and cargo between riverine towns and 
localities.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(*) Response index = group average response divided by overall average response.  (inv)FB= Fishing Boats; (inv)UA 
= Urban Artisanal; (inv)Nbg = Neighbors; (inv)CM = Community Members; COMMERC = Commercial resident 
fishers; CFLT = Conflict; ABNDC= Perceived Resource Abundance.   Type II CPR (exclusive fishing territories) 
communities showed the largest perceived abundance of local fish resources (lower bar) and the weakest internal 
competitiveness (upper bar). Type I/a (open-access) communities had the lowest level of perceived resource 
abundance and the weakest external competitiveness. Type I/b (failed CPR) communities had a profile similar to 
those of Type III CPR communities. Type III/2 CPR communities profile were distinct from that of Type III/1 CPR 
for their higher levels on internal competitiveness and perceived local resource abundance. 
 
 
Figure 1  - Fishery competitiveness and perceived resource abundance. 
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(*) Response index = group average response divided by overall average  response SHARE = Fishing spots shared 
with other community; FISHOTHER = Exploitation of other community’s fishing spots; OPEN = community’s 
fishing sport exploited commercially. Type I/a communities tended to share the ownership of their community 
fishing spots. Type I/b communities had more opportunities to exploit other communities’ fishing spots. Type II 
CPR communities were more dependent on exclusively owned fishing spots. Type III/2 communities had more 
fishing opportunities than Type III/1 communities did. They also were more likely to make some of their fishing 
spots accessible to outsiders and for commercial exploitation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(inv) ART = urban and rural artisanal fishers; (inv)FB = Fishing Boats; CFLT= Conflict; ABNDC = Abundance. 
Small-scale artisanal fishers were more important as invaders for communities that adopted seasonal CPRs. 
Large-scale commercial fishers were the main invaders of communities with annual CPRs. Unsolved fishery 
conflicts were twice as much common in seasonal than in annual CPRs.  
Figure 3  - Resource competitiveness and perceived 
abundance. 
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Figure 2  - Ownership status and fishing opportunities 
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Population size, internal competition and type of CPR regime 
The population growth analysis did not disclose any regularities with regard to type of 
CPR with possible exceptions in the case of the communities with CPR of Type II (only positive 
growth) and III/1.0 (only negative growth) (Figure 4). Communities with both negative and 
positive growth existed in all other sub-groups of CPR. However, it seemed that a broad 
demographic trend might exist. In the figure, the thicker vertical line divided the communities in 
two grand groups:  on the left (CPR I/a + CPR I/b + CPR II + CPR III / 1.0) and on the right 
(CPR III/1.1 and CPR III/2.1). Communities on the right possessed fishing agreements that 
limited individual capture effort; these communities were once larger in size than average, with 
exception of only six communities (6/22). No community to the left of the graph was larger than 
average in 1987 with exception of two communities (2/17).  
Communities’ decision-making on type of CPR regime and especially on inclusion of 
withdrawal norms is based on internal population pressure. The probability that these ratios were 
due to random factors was less than one tenth of 1% (Fisher's exact p two-tailed < 0.001). As 
foreseen in the theoretical models, less populous communities experienced a lower pressure of 
internal competition for resources and therefore they did not need to limit the capture effort of 
their members. On the other hand, populous communities suffered  higher pressure of internal 
competition, which justified the inclusion of operational rules that limited individual capture in 
the communal fishing spots. 
  Higher population density, per se, can lead to greater internal competition. In addition, 
reduced natural abundance of resources also causes greater competition among resource 
appropriators at similar population densities. This problem seemed to be the case for at least two 
of the exceptions found among CPR Type III/1.1.  Communities 40
th (São Miguel do Igarapé do 
Bonifácio) and 43
rd  (São Sebastião do Lago Moura) were located on small black-water 
tributaries where fish stocks are normally less abundant.   
 
Household economic factors and emergence of CPR Institutions 
One of the greatest difficulties for communities that adopted the management of lakes 
was the internal pressure of fish consumption. In many cases, the management scheme are 
impeded because the community’s members themselves were dependent on commercial fishing 
to support their households, without other economic alternatives. In Itacoatiara, the absence of 
economic alternatives generally was associated with the impoverishment of the households after 
the decline of jute industry because of restricted access to arable land suitable for other 
agricultural crops and cattle raising. For acceptance of fishing restrictions, it is essential that land 
and capital be available so that families can invest in economic activities alternative to fishing, 
such as agriculture, animal production, and collection of forest products.  
The results of the socioeconomic survey of 174 riverine households of the Itacoatiara 
region were used to compare the structures of economic opportunities and economic strategies of 
two different groups of households: commercial and subsistence fishers. Two different analyses 
were made: one included all surveyed households; in the other, households of CPR Type III/1.1 
were excluded. The need for this second analysis comes from the fact that in CPR III/1.1 
situations, households were “forced” to adopt an economic strategy that excluded fishing for a 
profit.  The category of “pescador” (fisher) was used by the riverine people to differentiate 
families who "live by fishing" from those others who live by domestic animals  (“criadores" = 
ranchers) or plant products ("feirantes" = market sellers). 
    
 
 
 
                Figure 4  - Demographic trends of communities (1987-1998) and their present CPR regimes. 
                
 
                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                            
 
On the horizontal axis is the information that identifies each community and its type of CPR. The vertical axis expresses the number of inhabitants 
in each community in the years of 1987 and 1998, in absolute numbers. The dashed horizontal line indicates the average population of the 
communities, including all shown communities (1987 = 160 inhabitants; 1998=154 inhabitants.). Each vertical line divides the communities in sub-
groups in accordance with the type of CPR. White bars mean positive while those dark bars indicate negative growth. The size of the bars indicates 
the population variation of each community in the referred  period. 
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Eighteen variables that accounted for the economic strategy and structural opportunities 
of households were assessed (Table 4). Households’ economic strategy was interpreted as being 
the group of activities a family engaged in order to obtain cash income. The amount of 
productive effort dedicated to a given activity was measured as the actual revenue gained by the 
household in each activity engaged in during the past production cycle and the monetary 
(exchange) value of animal and plant stocks. The amount of available land, ownership status, and 
the age structure of the familial labor-force depicted the structural opportunities. 
 
Table 4 – List of variables used to characterize household economic strategy and structural opportunity. 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION 
Strategic   
   stock$  Market value of all domestic animal herds owned by the household. 
   Animal  Annual revenue obtained from selling animal products: cheese, milk, meat and eggs. 
   Agriculture  Annual revenue obtained from selling plant products: agriculture and silviculture. 
   Stock2$  Market value of the product of perennial and semi-perennial plantations (one production cycle). 
   Retire  Annual revenue from governmental pensions (social security) (“aposentadoria”) 
   Salary  Annual revenue from formal jobs held in the community: e.g. local schoolteacher.  
   Off/farm  Annual revenue obtained from temporary jobs (“diarias”): carpenters, rural workers etc. 
Structural   
   Goods  Total estimated value of production goods: house, canoes, machinery, tools etc. 
   M>60  Number of resident males older than 60 years 
   F>55  Number of resident females older than 55 years 
   14<M<60  Number of resident males 14 to 60 years old  
   12<F<55  Number of resident females 12 to 55 years old 
   M<14  Number of resident males younger than 14 years old 
   F<12  Number of resident females younger than 12 years old 
   TFLand  Area of land available in terra-firme areas 
   Tftenure  Ownership status of terra-firme land 
   VZLand  Amount of land available in várzea areas 
   Vztenure  Ownership status of várzea land 
 
Commercial fishers’ households, on average, had similar performance in all the evaluated 
economic strategies with the exception of  “Stock2$” (Table 5). Subsistence fishers’ households 
had a stock of perennial crops almost five times greater than that of commercial fisher’s families, 
on average.  When Type III/1.1 communities were excluded, the analysis showed another 
significant difference between the two groups. In communities where fishery for a profit was 
allowed, commercial fisher’s households tended to sell a greater amount of their plant harvests. 
In addition, most commercial fisher’s households still cultivated and sold jute, a non-food 
agricultural product. Jute corresponded to 10 to 40.5% of the annual agricultural income of a 
community. 
Riverine families can exploit two different types of ecosystems: the floodplain (várzea) 
and the dry-land (terra-firme). One notices that the average composition of the families’ land 
holdings inverts when the two groups are compared. Families of subsistence fishers possessed on 
average 40 ha of terra-firme land and 20 ha of várzea, while commercial fisher’s families 
possessed on average 10 ha of terra-firme and 28 ha of várzea. Floodplain areas are workable 
only for 4 to 5 months of the year; their seasonal inundation is a strong obstacle to the cultivation 
of perennial or semi-perennial species. In the floodplain, the culture of banana, the main 
agricultural product after cassava, is very susceptible to annual floods.    
 
Table 5 – Kolmogorov-Smirnov two-sample test: subsistence fisher’s vs. commercial fisher’s households. 
  ALL  CASES     CPR¹III/1.1    
VARIABLE* SUBS 
FISHERS 
COMM 
FISHERS 
p-value <  SUBS  
FISHERS 
COMM 
FISHERS 
p-value < 
Strategic          
   stock$  -  -  n.s.  (4,416.02)  (3,288.20)  n.s. 
       (cattle)        (32)  (9)  (.29) 
   Animal  -  -  n.s.  -  -  n.s. 
   Agriculture  -  -  n.s.  1,136.33  1,926.73  .05 
   Stock2$  2,854.86  626.64  .001  2,434.27  652.27  .05 
   Retire  -  -  n.s.  -  -  n.s. 
   Salary  -  -  n.s.  -  -  n.s. 
   Off/farm  -  -  n.s.  -  -  n.s. 
Structural          
   Goods  -  -  n.s.  -  -  n.s. 
   M>60  -  -  n.s.  -  -  n.s. 
   F>55  -  -  n.s.  -  -  n.s. 
   14<M<60  1.84  2.56  .05  1.74  2.62  .05 
   12<F<55  -  -  n.s.  -  -  n.s. 
   M<14  -  -  n.s.  -  -  n.s. 
   F<12  -  -  n.s.  -  -  n.s. 
   TFLand  40.11  10.19  .001  31.35  10.60  .01 
   Tftenure  61.94%  23.07%  .001  56.86%  24.00%  .01 
   VZLand  20.52  28.11  .01  31.67  27.9  n.s. 
   Vztenure  35.71%  65.38%  .01  52.9%  66.0%  n.s. 
   N  113 52   51  50   
* Currency values are expressed in 1.00 R$ (~0.50 U$ dollars). 
 
The size of animal herds, especially cattle, was on average 3.5 times greater in non-
fisher’s households. Domestic animals were an important source of income and food, mainly 
during the flood when fishing is less productive. To be able to augment their animal herds, 
riverine families needed to make use of areas in terra-firme where the animals could be 
transferred during the flood. However, only 24% of the commercial fisher’s households 
possessed some area in terra-firme, against 72% of the families of “market sellers" and 
“ranchers”. Moreover, families who did not hold the definitive ownership of areas of terra-firme 
that they occupy were not eligible for agricultural development programs (bank financing) and 
therefore did not receive incentives to invest in the increase of the agricultural production and 
animal husbandry.  
With respect to familial labor-force, there was a clear distinction between the two groups 
of economic strategy. Commercial fisher’s households had 50% more males of productive age 
and were “younger” than subsistence fisher’s households, on average (Figure 5). 
In fact, as respondents reported, bigger and younger households were more likely to 
engage in the commercial fishery than elder ones. Generally, households whose heads were 
younger couples did not possess their own land and depended on their parents’ or parents-in-
laws’ land for a living. This feature may explain their lower rate of land tenure. Also, in younger 
households, most offspring still lived in the same house, causing the production/consumption 
ratio to be less favorable in these families (0.57±0.21 SD) compared to elder ones 
(0.63±0.25SD).  In addition, younger families’ land holdings were smaller and could not be    
further divided among descendents. This dilemma was also an important reason for unmarried 
adults to stay with their parents.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In commercial fisher’s households, adult males tended to remain longer at their parents’ 
house then females did. Females were more mobile than males since they could leave their 
parents’ house to join their in-laws’ family or migrate to the cities as housekeepers. An adult 
male will stay longer if his parent’s lands are not large enough for him to constitute a separate 
household. In conclusion, it can be said that the structure of economic opportunities was a 
determinant factor for household decision-making and that the option for commercial fishery was 
a consequence of such a limited set of opportunities.  
 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Rates of resource exploitation in less developed countries are often claimed to be 
exceedingly high; an allied claim is that the resulting pattern of management of natural resources 
is inefficient.  This observation is the starting point of an abundant literature that identifies the 
main source of inefficiency in the absence of well-defined property-rights and in regimens of 
open-access.  Garret Hardin used the expression "the tragedy of the commons" to restate this 
position in his seminal article  (Hardin 1968). However, according to current anthropological 
thinking, traditional local management systems have been the rule rather then the exception in 
much of the developing world.  
A common-pool resource situation was defined as the combination of a group of people 
and the resources they used collectively.  Early analysis of this situation tended to be pessimistic 
and irregular, in that it was permeated with confusion about vital differences between open-
access and common-property regimes. The two are distinguished by the regulations that govern 
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their use and by the power to exclude outsiders. Both of these considerations are the essence of 
common-property regimes (CPR). 
Debate has now progressed, and one important focus for research is the internal and 
external conditions that make CPR institutions robust.  It is believed that as long as these systems 
have been in existence, they have been fairly successful in conserving the natural resources at 
stake.   Unfortunately, many of these systems have broken down as a result of the disruptive 
impact of external forces such as centralized government polices, population growth, and broad 
market forces.  
The case of the CPRs of the Amazonian fisheries deserve special attention, for unlike 
fisheries elsewhere, the intensification of commercial fishing in the Amazon has not led to the 
breakdown of subsistence fisheries.  Much to the contrary, it seems that such external forces 
have led the local groups of resource users to create new local management institutions or to 
reinforce and modernize pre-existing ones.  In the Brazilian Amazon, since the 1970’s, several 
riverine communities have demanded political and legal support for their traditional management 
practices and property rights.  
It is not only in the Amazon River that CPR management groups have received 
increasing amounts of attention over the past two to three decades. CPR groups are active in all 
the areas of natural resource management: forest, water, and pasture resources.  Reform in all 
these sub-sectors, and a renewed emphasis on collective action and user participation more 
generally has highlighted the importance of CPR groups.  It is therefore critical that their 
strengths and weaknesses, and the likely boundaries of their activity should be well understood.   
There seems to be growing consensus that, when groups function as intended, common-
property regimes have been more effective than a central agency in managing resources.  Unlike 
government bodies, CPR groups have a direct stake in the future of the resource that they are 
managing. They also have ready access to information about members' needs and can react 
quickly to changes.  This combination of interest and efficacy means that both incentives for 
good management and the ability to manage well are enhanced. Thus, the idea of decentralizing 
natural resource management to local communities is increasingly gaining acceptance in policy 
making and in people-centered development projects. However, not all the outcomes of attempts 
to understand and encourage local management institutions have been positive.  
My theoretical goal in this study was to form an integrative approach of ecological 
theories of human territoriality, under the paradigm of rational-choice theory of collective action.  
With this work I attempted to establish epistemological connections between the human 
component and the environmental components of CPR situations.  
The first general conclusion was that Amazonian fishing communities, like many other 
rural societies, have the capacity to organize themselves. Further, their members were able to 
make credible commitments to monitor each other’s behavior and impose sanctions on those 
who displayed inappropriate behavior. Each community devised its own management institution 
to fit its needs by a long process of negotiation.  Each community had its own set of operational 
rules that had to be both socially and ecologically acceptable. Some of these communities were 
very successful in creating and maintaining their management institutions.  And the most 
important mechanism for that success was a change in their assessment of the impact of their 
own harvest practices on local fish stocks, especially in Type III communities. 
Amazonian riverine communities' way of life is very traditional. They have assimilated 
their indigenous legacy to cope with the challenges of an amphibious habitat: the flood plain. But 
these communities, as social organisms, are far from inert, as the term traditional often suggests.     
Awareness of ecological stress under conditions of increasing human pressure on the 
environment has led these societies towards an increased causal understanding of natural 
phenomena.  They have made radical revisions of old systems of beliefs so humans now are 
considered important agents of ecological change.  In general terms, it seems that they have 
adjusted their traditional common-property regimes to be a more efficient social mechanism to 
assure their subsistence and cultural needs under situations where resources are under high 
exploitation pressure.  
Contrary to what had been initially thought about the “lakes preservation movement” and 
its unexpected political nature, results of the first phase of the research suggested that this 
movement should be understood as being more than just individual reactions of riverine peoples 
to the changes occurring in their very local social and physical environments. Their common 
property regimes are better seen as adaptations of these communities as social institutions to the 
internal and external pressures and economic changes they experience with respect to the 
exploitation of their local stock of natural resources. In the case of the Itacoatiara region, the key 
resource is fish, a natural resource whose “use-value” is greater then its “exchange-value” for 
most of the riverine communities (Marx, 1995).  The economic changes that occurred and are 
occurring in the region have reflected the large-scale political scenario in which these local 
communities are embedded.  The conservationist attributes of many local fishery agreements 
also signify that the lake preservation movement should not be merely viewed as a “territorial” 
dispute between resident and non-resident fishers. 
  During the second phase of this research, each community selected was investigated in 
depth. The CPR regime of each selected community was studied from the households’ point of 
view. By centering the focus on a single community at a time, it was possible to unveil the 
particularities of each situation, to refine and quantify the first phase findings, and to derive some 
conclusive answers to the research questions initially proposed. The evolution of a commercial 
fishery and of floodplain agriculture in the Itacoatiara region was studied and this information 
allowed a contextual interpretation of the final results. 
As predicted, territorial defense increased with higher external competition for local 
resources, and restrictions on individual level of appropriation increased when resources became 
scarcer relative to internal consumption pressure.  Complemented by the microeconomic 
household perspective, these two sets of “environmental” factors seemed to explain the 
arrangement of fishing rules observed in each community.  As expected, open-access regimes 
(CPR I/a) were found in situations where perceived resource abundance was at its lowest level 
and internal and external competition pressure was moderate.  Failed management schemes 
(CPR I/b) were found in situations where external competition pressure exceeded a point such 
that the community could not bear the costs of controlling resource exploitation.  Type II CPRs 
were found where perceived local resource abundance was higher and competition pressure 
lower than the overall average. Management schemes (CPR III) were found in situations where 
fish resources were perceived as moderately abundant and internal competition more intensively 
felt. Household economic structure and opportunities were shown to be correlated with 
household decisions with respect to compliance with the community’s management scheme. For 
a household, the quality and the amount of available land, ownership status, and the age structure 
of the familial labor-force were essential for acceptance of fishing restrictions.   
The combination of ecological and economic theories and a more comprehensive 
contextual analysis allowed the elucidation of the complexity and the diversity of the common 
property regimes of Amazonian riverine communities. These communities have developed    
institutions that differ from those of caiçara fishers in the Brazilian Atlantic coast (Begossi, 
1998) and from those of lobster fishers of Maine (USA) (Acheson & Wilson 1996). Caiçara 
people and American lobster fishers based their management scheme on the "privatization" 
(individual ownership or ownership by groups - "harbor gangs" or extended families) of fishing 
spots or the products of the fishery, while the Amazonian riverine people, especially those of 
Type III communities, based their management schema on the collective ownership and defense 
of territories and the harvest of communal fishing spots. For Itacoatiarans, no individual or 
private group holds the right to alienate (to sell, to exchange, to transfer) a fishery territory. On 
the other hand, any individual belonging to the community holds the right to exclude non-
authorized fishers and to influence management decisions. Therefore, they are “proprietors” not 
“owners” of the lakes in the terms of Schlager and Ostrom (1993).  
While environmental factors, namely the relative density and level of competition for the 
resource in question, facilitated the emergence of regimes of collective property, internal 
microeconomic factors determined the degree of local compliance and success in maintaining 
such regimes. Household structures of economic opportunities sometimes made adherence to a 
conserving management scheme difficult by initially impeding its adoption or promoting its 
posterior dissolution. This defection happened when participant households could not change 
their economic strategies from commercial fishery to a purely subsistence fishery. However, 
being more than a simple result of human territoriality, many community management 
institutions (CPR III/1) were capable, either through relations of mutual aid, reciprocity, or 
advantages of exclusive use of local resources, to reach a high enough degree of compliance to 
maintain the internal fishery agreement.  
However, household economic decisions, when looked from the perspective of their 
communities, showed that the relationship between households, the individual units, and the 
community, the collective unit of economic decision-making, was dialectical in its nature. 
Households are the organic constituents of a democratic collective organization, the community, 
where social contracts are attained not only by undisputed universal consensus but also by peer 
pressures. Contrary to what has been unanimously suggested in the CPR literature, I do not think 
that the existence of an effective sanction system is a major determinant of success in CPR 
regulation schemes (Baland & Platteau 1996). Although eventually necessary, negative forms of 
coercion such as sanction and punishment can not be the internal mechanisms for the building a 
functional collectivity.  Public punishments are costly actions not only to the violators but also to 
the prosecutors. In small social groups, such as rural communities, where person-to-person direct 
relationships are the bases for social life, ostracism is the most efficient form of punishment but 
it also represents a tremendous threat for the group's existence itself.  
For instance, to make a common-pool resource management an attractive collective goal 
and to mitigate the initial impacts of its adoption, community membership should offer enduring 
advantages and economic alternatives to the familial units so as to lead them to take the 
necessary economic decisions, decisions  that may be detrimental to them in the short term. The 
importance of such positive constructing mechanisms has received little attention in the 
institutional analysis of common-pool resource groups. These positive mechanisms may prove to 
be a more decisive mechanism for the establishment of successful common-property regimes. 
To be able to save their fish stocks, the communities and their members reduced the 
commercialization of local fish stocks at the same time that they invested in agricultural and 
animal production activities as substitute sources of cash income. These institutions possessed an 
unquestionable conservationist character for they implied  "subsistence decisions that are costly    
to the actor in the short term but aimed at increasing the sustainability of the harvests in the long 
term” (Beckerman & Valentine, 1996). 
For Aguilera-Klink (1994) common property is not a tragedy as long as it exists as an 
institution or a set of rules appropriate for its management. These community institutions are 
based on the right of collective appropriation of fish spots. The contending parties, professional 
fishers, and community members alike, generally recognize such a right, despite its illegality. It 
appears to be based on shared cultural values. This recognition confers to the parties the 
authority to negotiate an endogenous solution for their disputes.  
Fishing communities of the Middle Amazon are eloquent examples of the fact that 
common property is not necessarily a tragedy as long as it exists as an institution or a set of rules 
appropriate for its management.  If an implacable tragedy exists, it is the tragedy of a state and of 
a society who ignores this logic and subverts traditional local institutions that adequately govern 
their common-pool resources. 
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Appendix B – Localization and classification of 62 communities inventoried in the research first phase. 
#  Zone  Community   Locality  Geographic reference  CPR  Case  Ann/Seas  2nd phase 
3 I  São José  Paraná da Simplícia  Boca de cima  I  a  -   
27  III  Espirito Santo  Paraná de Serpa  Paraná do Pai Tomás  I  a  -   
28  IV  Santa Rosa de Lima  Rio Arari  Arari Grande  I  a  -   
36  IV  São Lázaro  Rio Arari  Ig. Do Chocolateira  I  a  -   
5  I  São Sebastião  Paraná do Rio Preto  Lago do Arumã  I  a  -   
9  I  São João  Varre Vento  Rio Amazonas  I  a  -   
55  VI  São Francisco  Ilha do Cumaru  Ressaca do Cumaru  I  a  -   
23  III  Nova Esperança  Paraná de Serpa  Ilha de Risco  I  a  -  X 
14  III  São Francisco Xavier  Costa do Tabocal  Rio Amazonas  I  a(*)  -  X 
57  VI  Santo Antonio  Ilha do Cumaru  ressaca do Cumaru  1  a(*)  -   
1  I  São Seb. do P. União  Paraná da Eva  Ilha do Camaleão  I  b  -   
10  II  Na. Sra. P. Socorro  Costa da Conceição  Igarapé do Padre  I  b  -   
22  III  São João Batista  Paraná de Serpa  Igarapé do Carão  I  b  -   
35  IV  Tiradentes  Rio Arari  Furo do Arapapá  I  b  -   
51  VI  Santa Rosa  Ilha Grande do Soreano  Ilha Grande do Soreano  I  b  -   
52  VI  São João  Ilha Grande do Soreano  Ilha Grande do Soreano  I  b  -   
54  VI  São Raimundo  Ilha Grande do Soreano  Paraná do Sucumbira  I  b  -   
46  VI  Na. Sra. das Graças  Costa do Arapapá  Costa do Arapapá  I  b  -   
56  VI  Monte Sinai  Ilha do Cumaru  Ressaca do Cumaru  I  b  -  X 
60  IV  Ipixuna  Igarapé do ipixuna  Lago do Batista  I  b  -   
2  I  Sagrado Coração  Paraná da Eva  Lago do Engenho  II  -  Annual   
31  IV  Na. Sra. P. Socorro  Rio Arari  Ararizinho  II  -  Annual   
32  IV  Monte Cristo  Rio Arari  Ararizinho  II  -  Annual   
48  VI  São José  Ilha da Trindade  Paraná da Trindade  II  -  Annual  X 
53  VI  D. Pedro II  Ilha Grande do Soreano  Ilha Grande do Soreano  II  -  Annual   
13  III  São Sebastião  Costa do Siripá  Rio Amazonas  II  -  Seasonal  X 
58  VI  São João  Ilha do Cumaru  Rio Amazonas  II  -  Seasonal   
                
24  III  São Sebastião  Paraná de Serpa  Ilha do Risco  III  1.0  Annual   
25  III  Divino São Sebastião  Paraná de Serpa  Ilha do Risco  III  1.0  Annual   
50  VI  Santa Luzia  Ilha Grande do Soreano  Boca do Autaz  III  1.0  Annual   
21  III  São Lázaro  Paraná de Serpa  Igarapé do Assacu  III  1.0  Seasonal   
26 III  São  Raimundo (Alvor.)  Paraná de Serpa  Paraná de Serpa  III 1.0  Seasonal  X 
49  VI  Cristo Redentor  Ilha da Trindade  Ressaca do Cumaru  III 1.0  Seasonal   
6  I  Na. Sra. P. Socorro  Paraná do Rio Preto  Paraná do Rio Preto  III  1.1  Annual   
7  I  S. Fco. Pr. Do Jacaré  Paraná Jacaré  Paraná do Jacaré  III 1.1  Annual X 
18  III  Nova São Sebastião  Ilha do Risco  Paranazinho Ilha Nova  III  1.1  Annual   
19  III  Corpo de Cristo  Lago do Agostinho  Lago do Agostinho  III  1,1  Annual   
20  III  Santo Antônio  Lago do Agostinho  Lago do Agostinho  III  1.1  Annual   
37  IV  São João  Rio Arari  Ig. Do Chocolateira  III  1.1  Annual   
41  IV  São Fco. De Assis  Rio Arari  Igarapé do Pahí  III  1.1  Annual   
42  IV  São João do Araça  Rio Arari  Lago do Araça  III 1,1  Annual X 
43  IV  São Sebastião  Rio Arari  Lago do Moura  III  1.1  Annual   
45  V  Sagrado Coração  Lago de Serpa  Lago de Serpa  III 1.1  Annual X 
47  VI  Boa Esperança  Ilha da Trindade  Ilha da Trindade  III  1,1  Annual   
8  I  S. Fco do Varre Vento  Varre Vento  Rio Amazonas  III  1,1  Annual   
16  III  Santa Maria  Ilha do Risco  Paraná do Boqueirão  III  1.1  Seasonal   
17  III  Machado de Assis  Ilha do Risco  Paranazinho Ilha Nova  III  1,1  Seasonal   
33  IV  São Raimundo  Rio Arari  Boca do Curuça  III 1.1  Seasonal   
34  IV  São Paulo  Rio Arari  Boca do Jacaré  III 1,1  Seasonal   
38  IV  Vila Fátima  Rio Arari  Ig. Do Tucunaré  III  1.1  Seasonal   
40  IV  São Miguel  Rio Arari  Igarapé do Bonifácio  III  1.1  Seasonal  X 
11  II  Na. Sra. da Conceição  Costa da Conceição  Paraná da Trindade  III  2.1  Annual   
12  II  Na. Sra. Aparecida  Costa da Conceição  Paraná do Limão  III  2.1  Annual  X 
30  IV  São José  Rio Arari  Ararizinho  III  2.1  Annual   
44  IV  Na. Sra. do Livramento  Rio Arari  Lago do Stanislau  III  2.1  Annual   
29  IV  Natária  Rio Arari  Arari Grande  III  2.1  Seasonal   
4  I  Na. Sra. de Fátima  Paraná do Amatari  Ilha do Amatari  III  2.1  Seasonal   
15  III  Divino Espírito Santo  Ilha do Risco  Ilha do Risco  III  2.1  Seasonal   
39  IV  Rosental  Rio Arari  Ig. Terra Preta  III  2.1  Seasonal  X 
59  IV  Vila Batista  Lago do Batista  Rio Arari  III  2.1  Seasonal   
61  V  Santo Antonio  Lago do Canaçari  Cabeceira do Canaçari  III 2.1  Seasonal      
62 V  Santa Fé  Lago do Canaçari  Macuará  III 2.1  Seasonal   
(*) Privatization of lakes. 